Contemporary articles citing Fukuyama F (1995) Trust Social Virtues

order, trust, second, capital, account, first, economic, shared, explore, studies

Molm, Linda, David Schaefer & Jessica Collett. 2009. "Fragile and Resilient Trust: Risk and Uncertainty in Negotiated and Reciprocal Exchange." Sociological Theory. 27:1 1-32. Link
Both experimental and ethnographic studies show that reciprocal exchanges (in which actors unilaterally provide benefits to each other without formal agreements) produce stronger trust than negotiated exchanges secured by binding agreements. We develop the theoretical role of risk and uncertainty as causal mechanisms that potentially explain these results, and then test their effects in two laboratory experiments that vary risk and uncertainty within negotiated and reciprocal forms of exchange. We increase risk in negotiated exchanges by making agreements nonbinding and decrease uncertainty in reciprocal exchanges by having actors communicate their intentions. Our findings support three main theoretical conclusions. (1) Increasing risk in negotiated exchange produces levels of trust comparable to those in reciprocal exchange only if the partner's trustworthiness is near-absolute. (2) Decreasing uncertainty in reciprocal exchange either increases or decreases trust, depending on network structure. (3) Even when reciprocal and negotiated exchanges produce comparable levels of trust, their trust differs in kind, with reciprocal exchange partners developing trust that is more resilient and affect-based.

Erikson, Emily & Joseph Parent. 2007. "Central Authority and Order." Sociological Theory. 25:3 245-267. Link
Strong central authorities are able to effectively manage costly defection, but are unable to adequately address lesser conflicts because of limits to their ability to monitor and enforce. We argue, counterintuitively, that these limitations build cooperation and trust among subordinates: the limitations contribute to the production of order. First, limits to authority leave space for locally informed decentralized enforcement. Second, central authorities act as powerful but incompetent third parties whose threatened interventions increase incentives to cooperate and, therefore, to trust. We outline the mechanisms by which a strong central authority enforces order and test their utility by considering the secondary literature on rates of conflict in strong, weak, and capricious states. We supplement this evidence, based on association, with a close examination of diverse case studies: baseball umpires, commercial contracts, and domestic disputes. By analyzing these case studies, we isolate and describe the mechanisms by which central authorities produce order in varied settings. We find that central authority may be effective, but the majority of this effectiveness derives from an indirect influence on dyadic relations rather than direct intervention. The state interacts with local communities, but each operates according to distinct logics. The particular character of their interaction produces four mechanisms useful in the production of order. We briefly explore implications for the operation of law as well as the production of generalized trust. For it turned out that great acts of authority were so clumsy that experience itself has made known that only goodness of government brings prosperity.

Misztal, BA. 2001. "Normality and Trust in Goffman's Theory of Interaction Order." Sociological Theory. 19:3 312-324. Link
The article asserts that Goffman's concept of normality comes close to the notion of trust as a protective mechanism that prevents chaos and disorder by providing us with feelings of safety, certainty, and familiarity. Arguing that to account for the tendency of social order to be seen as normal we need to conceptualize trust as the routine background of everyday interaction, the article analyzes Goffmans concepts of normal appearances, stigma, and frames as devices for endowing social order with predictability, reliability, and legibility. For Goffman, normality is a collective achievement, which is possible because of the orderliness of interactional activities, which is-in turn-predicated ``on a large base of shared cognitive presuppositions, if not normative ones, and self-sustained restraints''.

Woolcock, M. 1998. "Social Capital and Economic Development: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework." Theory and Society. 27:2 151-208. Link

Favell, A. 1998. "A Politics That Is Shared, Bounded, and Rooted? Rediscovering Civic Political Culture in Western Europe." Theory and Society. 27:2 209-236. Link

Fedderke, J, R De & J Luiz. 1999. "Economic Growth and Social Capital: a Critical Reflection." Theory and Society. 28:5 709-745. Link

Kwon, HK. 2004. "Associations, Civic Norms, and Democracy: Revisiting the Italian Case." Theory and Society. 33:2 135-166. Link
By exploring associational life in early modern Italy, which the arguments of neo-Tocquevillians such as Robert Putnam explore, this article critically reconsiders the effects of associations upon democracy. By revealing how rich associational life resulted in the establishment of Fascism, I argue that associations do not necessarily contribute to the stabilization of democracy. In order to account better for meanings of associations, I emphasize transformation of identities of associations in a political and ideological context.

Kwon, Keedon. 2007. "Economic Development in East Asia and a Critique of the Post-confucian Thesis." Theory and Society. 36:1 55-83. Link
Some scholars have put forward what they call a post-Confucian thesis to explain East Asia's successful economic development. The thesis makes two important arguments: first, that Confucianism has enabled East Asian countries to take a different type of capitalism and a different path to modernity than did the West; second, that Confucianism has been the source of those ethics such as activism, hard work, thrift, and the like that have been conducive to economic development in East Asia. This article calls into question the first argument of the thesis by taking the example of the employment systems in Japan and Korea and showing that Confucianism has not been an important factor in defining their central features. In order to evaluate the second argument, this article investigates two major modernization campaigns in Japan and Korea, claiming that those supposedly Confucian virtues can be better seen as the products of the states' social engineering for modernization and economic development.

Barbalet, Jack. 2009. "A Characterization of Trust, and Its Consequences." Theory and Society. 38:4 367-382. Link
Trust is understood in terms of a) acceptance of dependency in b) the absence of information about the other's reliability in order to c) create an outcome otherwise unavailable. The first of these is the cost of trust; the second, the situation of uncertainty it faces and may overcome; the third, its purchase. This account permits: distinction between trust and similar relations with which it is frequently confused; discovery of the basis of trust in the emotional apprehension of confidence; and demonstration of the relationship between trust and both social capital and rationality, with counter-intuitive results.